By Raynah Jacobs
In my paper, I seek to determine if Hamas’s use of armed force, frequently termed “Jihad” by the movement’s members, is effective as a means of achieving political goals. I begin by establishing the movement’s political goals and the uses of force that comprise its armed resistance strategy. As with most political entities, the movement’s goals have evolved, and so too have the tactics it has adopted to carry out armed resistance.
Hamas’s early political goals are articulated most clearly in its charter, The Covenant of the Islamic Resistance Movement, released upon the movement’s establishment, in 1988. Most broadly, these goals are to establish a fully sovereign Palestinian state with Jerusalem as its capital, secure the right of return for Palestinians displaced since 1948, and general liberation and self-determination of the Palestinian people. Later, in 2017, the movement released a revised charter, A Document of General Principles and Policies, which refined some of the aspirations outlined in the first charter.
In addition to the goals outlined in the movement’s respective charters, I also incorporate objectives expressed by Hamas leaders in statements preceding various attacks against Israel. I include both to provide a comprehensive overview of the movement’s political goals. I then analyze the outcomes of Hamas’s most significant attacks to determine whether the movement’s use of armed force helped it achieve its most specific and broadest political goals in each instance. Such attacks range from low-level attacks against settlers to trans-border attacks, such as rocket fires, suicide bombings, and mass abductions.
Taken together, my analyses led me to conclude that Hamas’s use of armed force is largely ineffective as a means of achieving political goals. Indeed, in most cases, the movement’s use of armed force has provided the Israeli government with the–albeit sometimes dubious–grounds to take preemptive and defensive action against Hamas. These actions include but are not limited to, home demolitions, assassination campaigns, the erection of a security wall, as well as air strikes and ground invasions. Such counterattacks are almost invariably to the detriment of Palestinian freedoms, right to self-determination, access to the right of return, and liberation. Ultimately, my findings reveal that Hamas’s use of armed force is an ineffective political tactic, as it indirectly perpetuates the killing, dispossession, and discrimination of Palestinians, which, in turn, brings the movement further from achieving its political goals.
Sources
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